ERISA Preemption: Akzo v Thiokol by Van Tiflin, Patrick R. et al.
Michigan State University College of Law
Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law
Faculty Publications
10-1-1995
ERISA Preemption: Akzo v Thiokol
Patrick R. Van Tiflin
Michele LaForest Halloran
Michigan State University College of Law, hallor11@law.msu.edu
Kim D. Crooks
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.msu.edu/facpubs
Part of the Tax Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law. For more
information, please contact domannbr@law.msu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Patrick R. Van Tiflin, Michele L. Halloran & Kim D. Crooks, ERISA Preemption: Akzo v Thiokol, 74 Mich. B.J. 1048 (1995).
Tax Law
ERISA Preemption: Akzo v Thiokol©
By Patrick R. Van Tiflin, Michele L. Halloran
and Kim D. Crooks
n January 13, 1995, the United
States District Court in Akzo
America, Inc v Michigan Dept of
Treasury Docket No. 4:93-CV-
101 (hereafter referred to as
"Akzo"), found, contrary to the prior deci-
sion in Thiokol Corp v Roberts, 858 F Supp
674 (WD Mich 1994) (hereinafter referred
to as "Thiokol"), that the provisions of the
Michigan Single Business Tax Act ("SBTA')
which include employee fringe benefit ex-
penses in tax base are preempted by the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 ("ERISA"). The preemption issue
considered in Akzo and Thiokol centers
upon the provisions of the SBTA which add
back "compensation" to the "tax base. SBTA
§9 defines "tax base" as "business income,
before apportionment or allocation," subject
to a number of adjustments prescribed by
§9.1 One of the §9 add back adjustments is
compensation as defined in SBTA §4.2 In
turn, §4(3)3 of the SBTA defines "compen-
sation" in this fashion:
All wages, salaries, fees, ... payments to a
pension, retirement, or profit sharing plan
and payments for insurance for which em-
ployees are the beneficiaries, including pay-
ments under health and welfare and non-
insured benefit plans and payments offees for
D Copyright 1995. Howard & Howard Attorneys,
PC. All Rights Reserved.
administration of health and welfare and
noninsured benefit plans.
Thus, in order to properly compute Sin-
gle Business Tax ("SBT") base, and hence,
SBT liability, contributions to ERISA plans
must be considered. This addback provi
sion of the SBTA must then be read in con-
junction with the broad preemptive lan-
guage of ERISA. Section 514(a) of ERISA
preempts "any and all state laws insofar as
they may now or hereafter relate to any
employee benefit plan,"4 State tax laws are
specifically embraced by the ERISA pre-
emption provision under §514(b) (5) (B) (i)
which provides that "[n] othing in subpara-
graph (A) shall be construed to exempt
from subsection (a) of this section-0) any
state tax law relating to employee benefit
plans."5 The question that has been pre-
sented to and addressed by the District
Courts in Akzo and Thiokol is whether the
broad preemption clause of ERISA super-
sedes the SBTA to the extent it "relates to"
employee benefit plans. The decisions in
both Akzo and Thiokol have been appealed
to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.
THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
The focus of the preemption analysis en-
gaged in by both Akzo and Thiokol is on the
term "relate to" as used in ERISA §514(a).6
If a state law such as the SBTA "relates to"
an employee benefit plan, it is preempted.
In what has become a black letter explana-
tion of the meaning of "relate to,' the United
States Supreme Court in Shaw v Delta Air-
lines, Inc, 463 US 85; 77 L Ed 2d 490; 103
S Ct 2890 (1983) (hereinafter referred to as
"Shaw") said a law "relates to" an employee
benefit plan, in the normal sense, if it has
a "connection with" or a "reference to" such
a plan.7 In Shaw, however, the Court made
clear that not all state laws that have a "con-
nection with" an ERISA plan are preempted.
Some state laws are said to affect ERISA
plans in too "tenuous, remote or peripheral"
a manner to warrant a finding that they re-
late to a plan.8
The preemption issue
considered in Akzo
and Thiokol centers
upon the provisions of
the SBTA which add
back "compensation"
to the "tax base."
One issue which the state in Akzo and
Thiokol argued was left open by the United
States Supreme Court in Shaw was whether
the "tenuous, remote or peripheral" excep-
tion to the "relate to" test applied both to
state laws which had a "connection with"
an ERISA plan and to state laws which spe-
cifically "referred to" an ERISA plan. If each
prong is subject to the tenuous, remote or
peripheral standard, all state laws must be
analyzed under a three part test: (i) Does
the law have a connection with an ERISA
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plan? (ii) Does the law refer to an ERISA
plan? (iii) In either event, does the law re-
late to the plan in something more than a
tenuous, remote or peripheral manner?
The taxpayers in Akzo and Thiokol re-
jected this analysis, arguing that each prong
of the Shaw "relates to" test must be viewed
and analyzed separately. If the state law has
a "connection with" an ERISA plan but
does not specifically refer to the plan, the
law must then be analyzed to determine if
it has a connection with the plan in some-
thing more than a tenuous, remote or pe-
ripheral manner. On the other hand, if a
state law specifically refers to an ERISA
plan, it "relates to" the plan and that is the
end of the inquiry.
Several United States Supreme Court
cases have applied the "tenuous, remote
or peripheral" exception only to "connec-
tion with" cases. In 1988, the United States
Supreme Court in Mackey v Lanier Collec-
tions Agency & Service, Inc, 486 US 825;
100 L Ed 2d 836; 108 S Ct 2182 (1988), ad-
dressed ERISA preemption in the context
of a statute containing a specific reference
to an ERISA covered plan. There, the Court
found preemption with respect to a Georgia
law that specifically referred to ERISA plans
in exempting them from a generally ap-
plicable garnishment procedure. The Court
observed that "Io] n several occasions since
our decision in Shaw, we have reaffirmed
this rule, concluding that state laws which
make 'reference to' ERISA plans are laws
that 'relate to' those plans within the mean-
ing of §514(a)."9 The Court concluded that
"[tIhe state statute's express reference to
ERISA plans suffices to bring it within the
federal law's preemptive reach."10
Thereafter, in FMC Corp v Holliday, 498
US 52; 112 L Ed 2d 356; 111 S Ct 403
(1990), the Court dealt separately with both
OCTOBER 1995 MICHIGAN BAR JOURNAL
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the "reference to" and "connection with"
branches of the analysis for finding that the
state statute "relates to" a covered benefit
plan. In that case, despite the fact that the
Court found that the "insurance savings
clause" of ERISA excepted the Pennsylvania
statute from operation of the preemption
provision, the Court observed:
We made clear in Shaw v Delta Airlines,
supra, that a law relates to an employee wel-
fare benefit plan if it has a "connection with
or reference to such a plan." [citation omitted]
We based our reading in part on the plain
language of the statute. Congress used the
words "relate to' in §514(a) [the preemption
clause] in their broad sense." [citation omit-
ted] It did not mean to preempt only state
laws specifically designed to affect employee
benefit plans. That interpretation would have
made it unnecessary for Congress to enact
§514(b) (4) ... which exempts from preemp-
tion "generally" applicable criminal laws of
a state .... We also emphasize that to inter-
pret the preemption clause to apply only to
state laws dealing with the subject matters
covered by ERISA, such as reporting, disclo-
sure and fiduciary duties, would be incom-
patible with the provision's legislative his-
tory because the House and Senate versions
of the bill that became ERISA contained lim-
ited preemption clauses, applicable only to
state laws relating to specific subjects covered
by ERISA. These were rejected in favor of
the present language of the Act, "indicating
that the section's preemptive scope was as
broad as its language.""
hen, in District of Columbia v Greater
Washington Board of Trade, __ US
_; 113 S Ct 580; 121 L Ed 2d 513
(1992) (hereinafter referred to as "Greater
Washington"), the United States Supreme
Court put this issue to rest. There, the Court
acknowledged that the tenuous, remote or
peripheral standard is inapplicable where
the state statute under review contains a
reference to employee benefit plans reg-
ulated by ERISA. In Greater Washington,
the Court considered a District of Colum-
bia enactment that required an employer
providing health insurance coverage for
its employees to provide equivalent cover-
age for employees receiving or eligible to
receive workers' compensation benefits. In
testing whether the provision related to a
covered employee benefit plan for purposes
of ERISA §514(a), the Court said that the
state law in question there "specifically re-
fers to ERISA welfare benefit plans regu-
lated by ERISA and on that basis alone
is preempted."12
In analyzing the New York health insurance surcharge laws,
the Supreme Court observed that nothing in the language
of ERISA or the context of its passage indicates that
Congress chose to displace general health care regulation
which historically has been a matter of local concern.
Subsequent to the decision in Greater
Washington (and, of course, subsequent to
the decisions in Akzo and Thiokol), the
United States Supreme Court had the op-
portunity to consider yet another ERISA
preemption case. On April 26, 1995, the
Court handed down its decision in New
York State Conference of Blue Cross and Blue
Shield Plans, et al. v Travelers Insurance Com-
pany, et al., Docket No. 93-1408 (herein-
after referred to as '"New York Blue Cross"). In
that case, the United States Supreme Court
sought to determine whether surcharges
imposed upon patients and HMO's were
preempted by ERISA.
The Court initially made reference to the
Shaw test which explains that a law relates
to an employee benefit plan if it has a "con-
nection with or reference to such a plan."
The Court ruled out the latter alternative
because the surcharge statutes could not, in
the Court's view, be said to make "reference
to" ERISA plans in any manner. This still left
the question whether the surcharge laws
had a "connection with" the ERISA plans.
In analyzing the New York health insur-
ance surcharge laws, the Supreme Court
observed that nothing in the language of
ERISA or the context of its passage indi-
cates that Congress chose to displace gen-
eral health care regulation which histori-
cally has been a matter of local concern. By
contrast, the preemption clause of ERISA
specifically includes within its preemptive
sweep any state tax law relating to em-
ployee benefit plans. The critical feature of
the New York surcharge was that it did not
bind plan administrators to any particular
choice for health insurance. The Court ob-
served that a New York ERISA plan may
choose among commercial insurers, HMO's
and Blue Cross plans to acquire health in-
surance. The existence of this choice saved
the New York insurance charges from pre-
emption because their indirect economic
influence did not bind plan administrators
to any particular choice.
Of particular significance in the New
York Blue Cross case is the reaffirmation
of the Greater Washington "one step" analy-
sis of "reference to" preemption cases. If,
as suggested by some, the United States
Supreme Court only inadvertently stated
that a state statute which "refers to" an
ERISA plan is preempted on that basis
alone, the United States Supreme Court
had the perfect opportunity to correct that
position in New York Blue Cross.13 The
Court's application of the alternative tests
set forth in Shaw suggests that the Supreme
Court has and will adhere to its position
in Greater Washington.
APPLICATION OF PREEMPTION
ANALYSIS TO SBTA
As will become evident, the decisions
of Judge Hillman and Judge Bell in Thiokol
and Akzo, respectively, were based in large
part upon their respective interpretations of
the decision of the United States Supreme
Court in Greater Washington. Although the
taxpayers in both Akzo and Thiokol still
vehemently argue that the SBTA "relates
to" ERISA in more than a tenuous, remote
or peripheral manner (thus satisfying the
"connection with" prong of the Shaw test),
resolution of this issue by the Sixth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals may hinge upon the
Court's view of the United States Supreme
Court decision in Greater Washington.
In Thiokol, Judge Hillman initially ap-
proached the preemption issue by refer-
ence to the familiar Shaw "relate to" stan-
dard. The Thiokol Court recognized that
"relate to" as used in §514(a) should be
given a broad common sense meaning.
While ERISA preemption is expansive, the
Court stated that it is not all encompassing:
The Shaw Court found that, "some state ac-
tions may affect employee benefit plans in
too tenuous, remote or peripheral a manner
to warrant a finding that the law 'relates to'
the plan."... The task then is to determine the
precise relationship between a state law and
an ERISA plan, specifically answering the
questions whether the state law affects an
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ERISA plan in too tenuous, remote or periph-
eral a manner to "relate to" the plan.14
In reaching his conclusion, Judge Hill-
man relied upon the decision of the United
States Third Circuit Court of Appeals in
United Wire v Morristown Memorial Hospi-
tal, 995 F2d 1179 (3rd Cir 1993), cert den
__ US _; 126 L Ed 2d 332; 114 S Ct 382
(1993) (hereinafter referred to as "United
Wire"). In that case, the Court determined
that a law which "relates to" an ERISA plan
will only be preempted if the law is spe-
cifically designed to affect ERISA plans, if
it singles out such plans for special treat-
ment, or if it is predicated on the existence
of such plans. Each factor identified in
United Wire, the Thiokol Court observed,
relates to whether the law is neutral and
general. The Court in United Wire deter-
mined that, because the statute in question
was a law of general applicability which
functioned without regard to the existence
of ERISA plans (that is, it was both neu-
tral and general), the statute did not "re-
late to" ERISA.'5
he Thiokol Court recognized, how-
ever, that other courts have found
that state laws can "relate to" ERISA,
and thus be preempted, even if they are
neutral laws of general application.1 6 So,
the Thiokol Court's determination that the
SBTA is a neutral tax law of general appli-
cation did not end the analysis. Even laws
of neutral and general application are pre-
empted by ERISA if they affect an ERISA
plan in more than a tenuous, remote or pe-
ripheral manner.'7
The Court then turned to Firestone Tire
& Rubber Co v Neusse, 810 F 2d 550 (CA 6
1987) (hereinafter referred to as "Firestone"),
in which the Court identified three factors
to be examined in ascertaining whether a
law's affect on an ERISA plan is "too tenu-
ous, remote or peripheral:" Whether the
state law reflects a traditional exercise of
state authority; whether the state law af-
fects relations among the ERISA entities,
i.e., the employer, the plan, the plan fidu-
ciaries, and plan beneficiaries; and whether
the effect of the state law on the ERISA
plan is incidental.
In applying the Firestone factors, the
Court first noted that the Michigan SBTA
involves an area of traditional state regula-
tion. However, the Court recognized that
this factor was not particularly useful as
it did not have any relationship to, or im-
pact upon, whether the law affected an
ERISA plan.18
Judge Hillman also found that the SBT
affects employers in their capacity as em-
ployers without regard to their status as
plan sponsors, and does not affect the re-
lations among the employer, the plan, the
administrator, fiduciaries or beneficiaries.
Judge Hillman's decision on this point con-
tains a specific finding that the SBT is levied
against all employers regardless of whether
or not they contribute to an ERISA plan.
He also concluded that the SBT has only an
incidental affect on ERISA plans. Although,
acknowledging that the SBT may affect total
ERISA contributions by employers, the ef-
fect, in Judge Hillman's view, is tenuous, re-
Until resolution of the
pending Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals cases in Akzo
and Thiokol, ERISA-based
claims filed in the
Michigan Court of Claims
will be held in abeyance.
mote and peripheral. This is due to the fact
that it fails to affect the relationship among
any ERISA entities, while the affect on total
contributions to ERISA plans is incidental
because it simply fails to allow for a de-
duction for plan contributions. The Court
specifically held that "the SBTA is not pre-
empted by ERISA merely because it im-
poses a cost on business'
The second basis for Judge Hillman's de-
cision is his conclusion that the opinion of
the United States Supreme Court in Greater
Washington did not hold that a state statute
which makes a specific reference to welfare
benefit plans regulated by ERISA is, on that
basis alone, preempted. In Judge Hillman's
view, "a mere reference to ERISA within the
state tax law does not, in and of itself, man-
date preemption ?'20 The Court explained:
While a mere reference to ERISA establishes
that a law "relates to" ERISA, the law is pre-
empted by ERISA only if it "relates to" ERISA
in something more than a "tenuous, remote
or peripheral manner"... Since that pro-
nouncement, the Court has consistently re-
iterated this standard .... The Court's stan-
dard necessarily establishes a two part test
for laws which refer to ERISA. A law "re-
lates to" ERISA if it has a "reference to" an
ERISA plan, but is preempted only if it "re-
lates to" ERISA in something more than a
"tenuous, remote or peripheral" manner21
In finding as it did, the Court refused
to read the United States Supreme Court's
pronouncement in Greater Washington as
standing for the proposition that a state
statute may be preempted by ERISA if it
"refers to" an ERISA plan, despite the fact
that, in Greater Washington, Justice Thomas
stated that a state law which "specifically
refers to welfare benefit plans regulated by
ERISA' is "on that basis alone" preempted.
While recognizing that the Court in Greater
Washington appeared to adopt a "one part
bright line rule," Judge Hillman found that,
even after Greater Washington, the "tenuous,
remote or peripheral" standard set forth in
Shaw controlled the disposition of the case.
The Court stated:
While a single sentence of the majority's
opinion in Greater Washington appears to
overturn the ten year old Shaw test, all other
evidence, and common sense reasoning, es-
tablishes that the Court did not overturn the
Shaw standard2
Judge Hillman cited four specific reasons
for this conclusion. First, he read Greater
Washington as directly overturning the
Shaw test, without so much as an acknowl-
edgement of doing so. Because the Court
did not articulate reasons for what Judge
Hillman perceived was an overturning of
Shaw, and the ambiguous nature of its ex-
planation and "mere reference to" language,
Judge Hillman felt compelled to follow the
"well established precedent set forth in
Shaw"23 Second, after Greater Washington,
no court had found a state statute to be pre-
empted by ERISA merely because it made
reference to it. Third, the "bright line, mere-
reference-to test" apparently adopted in
Greater Washington forced an "unrealistic
and illogical game of semantics upon state
legislatures, demanding only that they do
not use the forbidden words."24 Finally, the
Patrick R. Van Tiflin, Michele L. Halloran and Kim
D. Crooks are members of the law firm of Howard
& Howard Attorneys, P.C. in Lansing. Pat directs
the firm's state and local taxation practice; Michele
is a former Hearing Officer with the Michigan Tax
Tribunal and Kim joined Howard & Howard's state
and local taxation group in March of this year
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use of this bright line rule might cause the
preemption of hundreds of existing state
laws, if challenged.
Unlike Judge Hillman, Judge Bell in
Akzo, while agreeing with the bulk of Judge
Hillman's analysis with regard to the nature
of the SBT and its connection with ERISA
plans, disagreed with Judge Hillman's analy-
sis of the impact of Greater Washington. In
essence, Judge Bell viewed the Shaw "relate
to" preemption standard as creating two
distinct tests to determine ERISA preemp-
tion, only one of which employed the ten-
uous, remote or peripheral standard.
he analysis by the Court in Akzo be-
gan, like Thiokol, with the familiar
Shaw test that a state law "relates to"
an employee benefit plan if it has a con-
nection with or reference to such a plan.
Accordingly, the Court found that the ques-
tion of whether a state law relates to an
ERISA plan is answered in the affirma-
tive in two distinct situations: Where the
state law has a "connection with" an ERISA
plan; and where the state law "refers to"
an ERISA plan.
Like Judge Hillman in Thiokol, Judge Bell
focused on the standard established by the
Supreme Court for state laws which affect
employee benefit plans in too "tenuous, re-
mote or peripheral" a manner. The state ar-
gued that Shaw establishes that the tenu-
ous, remote or peripheral exception applies
Answers to puzzle (see page 1043).
to any state law which relates to an ERISA
plan regardless of whether it relates to the
plan as a result of its connection with the
plan or its reference to the plan.
The Court in Akzo disagreed, finding
that the United States Supreme Court re-
jected this very argument in Greater Wash-
ington. Unlike the Court in Thiokol, the
Akzo Court had no trouble finding that a
state law which refers to an ERISA plan can
be preempted "on that basis alone." The
Court found that the United States Supreme
Court in Greater Washington made it clear
that the tenuous, remote or peripheral ex-
ception only applies to "connection with"
situations when it: Failed to consider the
exception with regard to a "reference to" sit-
uation; and said that "preemption does not
occur, however, if the state law only has
tenuous, remote or peripheral' connection
with covered plans... (emphasis added).
Given its interpretation of Greater Wash-
ington, the Court concluded that, since
§4(3) of the SBTA refers to plans regulated
by ERISA, it is, on that basis alone, pre-
empted.2 5 Judge Bell's decision has set the
stage for resolution of the issue by the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.
CONCLUSION
While Judge Hillman and Judge Bell
substantially agreed upon how the §9
compensation addback provisions of the
SBTA relate to ERISA, they fundamentally
disagreed upon the proper analysis 6 Res-
olution of the ERISA preemption issue may
very well turn upon which Court has prop-
erly interpreted the United States Supreme
Court's holding in Greater Washington.
Nonetheless, the Sixth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals will also be presented with the tax-
payers' additional argument that the com-
pensation addback provisions of the SBTA
relate to an ERISA plan in more than a ten-
uous, remote or peripheral manner. So, the
Sixth Circuit will also have an opportunity
to take a fresh look at the scope and appli-
cation of the tenuous, remote and periph-
eral exception as it applies to the SBTA.
Michigan taxpayers should consider
excluding from SBT base contributions
made to pension and profit sharing plans,
health and life insurance premiums and
fees paid for administration of plans, sub-
ject to ERISA, on the authority of Akzo.
Until resolution of the pending Sixth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals cases in Akzo and
Thiokol, ERISA-based claims filed in the
Michigan Court of Claims will be held in
abeyance. 0
Footnotes
1. MCL 208.9; MSA 7558(9).
2. MCL 208.9(5); MSA 7.558(9)(5).
3. MCL 208.4(3); MSA 7.558(4)(3).
4. 29 USC §1144(a).
5. 29 USC §1144(b)(5)(B)(i).
6. 29 USC §1144(a).
7. 77 LEd 2d at 501.
8. 77 L Ed 2d at 503, ftn 21.
9. 100 LEd 2d at 843.
10. 100 L Ed 2d at 844.
11. 112 L Ed 2d at 354-365.
12. 121 L Ed 2d at 520.
13. In Greater Washington, Justice Stevens au-
thored a separate dissenting opinion which
suggests that the majority did not reaffirm
its one step analysis of reference to pre-
emption cases by mere inadvertence.
14. 858 F Supp at 676.
15. 858 F Supp at 679.
16. 858 F Supp at 679.
17. 858 F Supp at 680.
18. 858 F Supp at 680.
19. 858 F Supp at 681.
20. 858 F Supp at 681.
21. 858 F Supp at 681-682.
22. 858 F Supp at 682.
23. 858 F Supp at 682.
24. 858 F Supp at 683.
25. ERISA preemption was raised by the tax-
payer in Akzo not only as to the "substan-
tive" issue, but also as to the validity of the
90-day statute of limitations period for
bringing an action based on federal law or
the Constitution. The Court in Akzo con-
cluded that MCL 205.27a(6) does not
make reference to an ERISA plan and is not,
therefore, preempted on that basis. The
Court then concluded that §27a(6) has, at
most, only a tenuous, remote or peripheral
connection with a covered plan and so, on
that basis as well, it is not preempted by
ERISA. The Court also found that MCL
205.27a(6) was not invalid on constitu-
tional grounds. The Court found that a sta-
ble public fisc was the rational basis which
supported the legislation.
26. To his opinion in Akzo, Judge Bell in fact
expressed his agreement with all of Judge
Hillman's findings except his conclusion
that a state law is not preempted by ERISA,
merely because it "refers to" an ERISA plan.
MICHIGAN BAR JOURNAL
TAXATION
Solution
OCTOBER 195HeinOnline -- 74 Mich. B.J. 1052 1995
7rhis
Book
Michigan Limited Liability Company
Forms and Practice Manual
You already know that LLCs are the hottest
business entity in the country. You also know that
Michigan has had its law since June 1, 1993.
You Need Forms
You need forms and we've got them. Over
150 to speed up your work along with expert
commentary by four of the leading authorities
on Michigan LLC Law. You will learn when
and why each form should be used.
You've Got A Computer
Great. We've got every Michigan LLC form
available on computer diskette. Just bring up a
form and fill in the blanks. It's that simple.
Michigan Limited Liability Company
Forms and Practice Manual
This 500+ page book including over 150
forms with detailed analysis costs just
$149.95. Optional computer diskette contain-
ing every form is available with book purchase
for $49.95.
Wrte for Michigan Lawyer
by Mihgn ayr
To place your order or for more information call:
Data Trace Legal Publishers, Inc.
P.O.Box 1239
Brooklandville, MD 21022
1-800-342-0454
LA3
HeinOnline -- 74 Mich. B.J. 1053 1995
